Imagine: How Creativity Works by Jonah Lehrer is an entertaining, though, rudimentary introduction to the psychological and sociological dimensions of creativity. It leaves one with more questions than answers. Furthermore, the answers it provides are not especially Earth shaking and the questions it raises are largely due to a superficial treatment of the topic.
The most significant shortcoming is Lehrer's failure to give a clear definition of creativity. While he occasionally writes about artistic creativity, most of the book focuses on problem solving in the high-tech industry. This is perhaps unsurprising in that Lehrer is first of all a contributing editor at Wired magazine. Not only are his central cases of creativity peculiar, Lehrer gives us no sense of the scope of problem solving. Some problems stand out for us and require significant time and energy to solve. Others are routine and mundane. For example, how to open an unfamiliar cabinet door might count as a problem to be solved, but the solution might also reveal itself after only a moment's examination. To be fair, one could distinguish degrees of creativity that map to the difficulty of the problem, but complex problems could be broken down into numerous smaller problems. Any of these problems might also be more or less obvious depending upon the background knowledge of the person solving the problem. The point here, is that the concept of problem solving is not as simple as it appears in Lehrer's book. To make problem solving the central case of creativity without exploring these complexities provides us with only a superficial insight into creativity.
The specific claims about problem solving that Lehrer does make are few and sometimes contradictory. Certainly, Lehrer is not unaware of these contradictions, but he provides us with little help in understanding how we can resolve them. For example, his first substantive claim is that creativity (in solving a problem) often comes after one has focused on a problem long enough to conclude that it is unsolvable. Then, after taking one's mind off of the problem and relaxing, one is able to see the problem from a broader perspective and possibly connect seemingly unrelated facts or concepts in manner that provides the necessary insight.
In contrast to this, Lehrer also observes that problems are often solved by sheer, dogged concentration. Instead of a relaxing walk in the woods or taking a warm shower, the problem is solved by taking enough Benzedrine to keep one's mind fixed on the problem. All that a reader can conclude from this is that problems get solved in lots of different ways. This is by no means a surprising revelation.
The more interesting portion of his work comes when he discusses the social context of problem solving. Lehrer observes that many problems are solved by "outsiders," i.e., people who are not steeped in the paradigms of the field that contains the problem. They are sometimes capable of pursuing solutions that an insider would discount as implausible from the start. He also observes that difficult problems are more likely to be solved when numerous people with different backgrounds collaborate in seeking a solution. One is reminded of the commonplace maxim, "two heads are better than one."
Again, Lehrer's observations about society and creativity are not terribly enlightening; however, the final chapter begins to make a bit more of the social elements of creativity. Lehrer points out that different times in history, social circumstances have fostered creativity. His chief example is Elizabethan England. According to Lehrer, the liberal attitude toward theatre productions and the availability of written material in 16th and 17th century England made possible a flowering of excellent dramatic productions, including the work of William Shakespeare. According to Lehrer, Shakespeare's success was in large part due to favorable social conditions, though his genius certainly made him stand out from the numerous other talented playwrights of his time.
This emphasis on the social climate for creativity does not, however, reach far enough. Lehrer overlooks (or at least understates) the role that resources play in problem solving. According to Lehrer, venture capital funding "is widely regarded as one of the best measures of innovation; money chases good ideas." While it may be true that venture capitalists constantly are seeking to invest in good ideas, a more likely relationship is that venture capital, along with a lot of unanticipated and coincidental factors make an idea successful. Without these external circumstances, good ideas are apt to come to nothing. We have no way of tracking all those extremely creative, but unlucky ideas. While so many other factors are involved in the success of an idea, one cannot use success alone as a defining characteristic of a good idea. Because Lehrer overlooks these factors, his book tends to reinforce the cult of the entrepreneur.
Among the best aspects of the Imagine is Lehrer's effort to ground his claims about creativity and problem solving on scientific research. Unfortunately, he does not always provide complete citations for these references. While one could track down some of the original research, it would be difficult to get to all of it. This forces the reader to simply accept Lehrer's judgements about the quality and representativeness of much of the research on which he draws.
All in all Imagine is an easy and often entertaining work, aimed at a popular audience, but for anyone genuinely interested in creativity, it's not a good use of time.
Monday, July 2, 2012
Saturday, June 23, 2012
Butterflies Worth Knowing / Clarence M. Weed -- Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1925
Not having any significant knowledge of butterflies, it is difficult for me to know how reliable Butterflies Worth Knowing is. First of all, much has changed since it was copyrighted in 1917 and published in 1925. Large swaths of butterfly habitat have been destroyed, migration routes are different, and climate conditions are changing. Nonetheless, much in the work is in all likelihood quite reliable.
The introduction to Butterflies Worth Knowing describes the behaviors, life histories, and attributes common to most all butterflies and provides a little advice on photographing and collecting butterflies. It then provides entries for scores of butterfly families, tribes, and individual species found in North America. Accounts of the discernable features of the butterflies are likely still reliable. The descriptions of their life histories, though, may be less so. The author, Clarence Weed, frequently acknowledges that there are gaps in the current understanding of one or another species. Indeed, he ocassionally suggests a fertile research topic for young entomologists. His very caution makes one wonder if there also might not be mistakes in his settled understanding, particularly as the growth of our knowledge of the natural world has changed significantly since Butterflies Worth Knowing was written.
Regardless of these doubts, reading the work cover to cover (as opposed to using it as a reference book) likely leaves the lay reader with a better impression of North American butterflies generally. Unfortunately, reading it cover to cover subjects the reader to a repetition of details describing slightly varying species, making it a bit mind numbing. The best use of Butterflies Worth Knowing would be to consult it in conjuction with a recently published reference work on butterflies to see just how our understanding has changed.
The introduction to Butterflies Worth Knowing describes the behaviors, life histories, and attributes common to most all butterflies and provides a little advice on photographing and collecting butterflies. It then provides entries for scores of butterfly families, tribes, and individual species found in North America. Accounts of the discernable features of the butterflies are likely still reliable. The descriptions of their life histories, though, may be less so. The author, Clarence Weed, frequently acknowledges that there are gaps in the current understanding of one or another species. Indeed, he ocassionally suggests a fertile research topic for young entomologists. His very caution makes one wonder if there also might not be mistakes in his settled understanding, particularly as the growth of our knowledge of the natural world has changed significantly since Butterflies Worth Knowing was written.
Regardless of these doubts, reading the work cover to cover (as opposed to using it as a reference book) likely leaves the lay reader with a better impression of North American butterflies generally. Unfortunately, reading it cover to cover subjects the reader to a repetition of details describing slightly varying species, making it a bit mind numbing. The best use of Butterflies Worth Knowing would be to consult it in conjuction with a recently published reference work on butterflies to see just how our understanding has changed.
Monday, June 11, 2012
Planning for Uncertainty: Living Wills and Other Advance Directives... / David John Doukas and William Reichel -- Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2007
Medical science has reached a stage of development in which the ability to keep a person's body alive well outstrips its ability to maintain worthwhile cognitive functions. Consequently, irreversible comas, persistent vegetative states, and extended periods of unconsciousness during the final stages of an illness are increasingly common. This raises troubling questions for families and doctors regarding what sort of treatment is appropriate in such cases. In response, living wills, durable powers of attorney, and other advance directives have become increasingly popular. Still only a small percent of people draw up such instruments. Planning for Uncertainty: Living Wills and Other Advance Directives\ by Doukas and Riechel provides a useful guide to thinking about these critical situations and offers practical advice on drawing up an advance directive.
The work provides some background for the legal development of advance medical directives, but it's real strength is providing the reader with the opportunity to think carefully and systematically about issues that they might otherwise consider in a jumbled and confused way. However, when all is said and done, it seems that the purpose of most advance directives is to provide assurance to the doctors and family members of an unconscious patient that withholding or withdrawing treatment is a morally acceptable path. In some cases, it can also bind a family to withhold or withdraw treatment or establish obstacles to such a course.
There are numerous books of this sort in print. One may be as good as another. Anyone seeking to draw up an advance directive would be well advised to investigate the state laws that regulate such documents.
The work provides some background for the legal development of advance medical directives, but it's real strength is providing the reader with the opportunity to think carefully and systematically about issues that they might otherwise consider in a jumbled and confused way. However, when all is said and done, it seems that the purpose of most advance directives is to provide assurance to the doctors and family members of an unconscious patient that withholding or withdrawing treatment is a morally acceptable path. In some cases, it can also bind a family to withhold or withdraw treatment or establish obstacles to such a course.
There are numerous books of this sort in print. One may be as good as another. Anyone seeking to draw up an advance directive would be well advised to investigate the state laws that regulate such documents.
Saturday, June 9, 2012
The Happiness Project / Gretchen Rubin -- N.Y.: Harper, 2009
The Happiness Project by Gretchen Rubin is the sort of light reading that you'll find in popular, daily blogs. It fits into the gimmicky genera of "The Year of... books" (the year of eating locally, the year of living Biblically, the year of cooking Julia Child recipes, etc...). Rubin's year consisted in making a "project" of being happier. Rubin chose this project on the belief that being happy is often thought to be the most important goal in life and while she felt she already was happy, becoming happier would not be a bad goal.
Her project divided into committing herself to twelve resolutions, one of which she concentrated on each month of the year. Actually, her twelfth resolution was to fulfill all her previous eleven resolution at once. My initial reaction to the project was somewhat negative: turning being happy into a project seemed rather artificial to me, but there were enough thoughtful passages early in the book to make me think that the book would eventually offer something worthwhile. Furthermore, Rubin anticipated nearly every facile criticism of the book that crossed my mind. She dispensed with them in a rather charming and disarming way, writing something along lines of, "O.K., but if I'm going to be happy, I've got to be myself, so I'm going to do this anyway." Fair enough.
The most serious objection to her work is the superficiality of her concept of happiness. Despite claiming to have read Aristotle, John Stuart Mill, and the Dalai Lama (or some other treatment(s) of Buddhism), her notion of happiness is by and large the temporary psychological state that has its epitome in euphoria. Contrast this with, in particular, Aristotle's concept of happiness (or eudaimonia) which goes well beyond euphoria to involve living a good life. If Rubin truly wants to follow the path recommended by philosophers through the ages, then the happiness that she ought to seek should reach beyond her first-person perceptions of her own emotional state. Certainly, pleasant experiences are likely to be a component of happiness, or a good life, but Rubin seems to think that the highest good is built on these experiences. To be fair, she occasionally recognizes that happiness contains components that are other than euphoria, but the bulk of her book is a compendium of tips on on boosting one's mood. One wonders if Prozac, Paxil, or Ecstacy might be an easier and more effective approach.
Despite this criticism, her mood-enhancing tips are frequently worthwhile and given the success of her blog, they appear to resonate with many blog-readers; some of whom claim to be following her explicit advice and engaging in "happiness projects" of their own. One should not diminish the importance of maintaining a happy state of mind nor deny that it can be cultivated. Rubin reports that her project was successful, and if it leads others to enhance their own happiness, it is all to the good. The danger is that it will feed narcissistic and ego-centric tendencies that are a significant obstacle to the general happiness.
Her project divided into committing herself to twelve resolutions, one of which she concentrated on each month of the year. Actually, her twelfth resolution was to fulfill all her previous eleven resolution at once. My initial reaction to the project was somewhat negative: turning being happy into a project seemed rather artificial to me, but there were enough thoughtful passages early in the book to make me think that the book would eventually offer something worthwhile. Furthermore, Rubin anticipated nearly every facile criticism of the book that crossed my mind. She dispensed with them in a rather charming and disarming way, writing something along lines of, "O.K., but if I'm going to be happy, I've got to be myself, so I'm going to do this anyway." Fair enough.
The most serious objection to her work is the superficiality of her concept of happiness. Despite claiming to have read Aristotle, John Stuart Mill, and the Dalai Lama (or some other treatment(s) of Buddhism), her notion of happiness is by and large the temporary psychological state that has its epitome in euphoria. Contrast this with, in particular, Aristotle's concept of happiness (or eudaimonia) which goes well beyond euphoria to involve living a good life. If Rubin truly wants to follow the path recommended by philosophers through the ages, then the happiness that she ought to seek should reach beyond her first-person perceptions of her own emotional state. Certainly, pleasant experiences are likely to be a component of happiness, or a good life, but Rubin seems to think that the highest good is built on these experiences. To be fair, she occasionally recognizes that happiness contains components that are other than euphoria, but the bulk of her book is a compendium of tips on on boosting one's mood. One wonders if Prozac, Paxil, or Ecstacy might be an easier and more effective approach.
Despite this criticism, her mood-enhancing tips are frequently worthwhile and given the success of her blog, they appear to resonate with many blog-readers; some of whom claim to be following her explicit advice and engaging in "happiness projects" of their own. One should not diminish the importance of maintaining a happy state of mind nor deny that it can be cultivated. Rubin reports that her project was successful, and if it leads others to enhance their own happiness, it is all to the good. The danger is that it will feed narcissistic and ego-centric tendencies that are a significant obstacle to the general happiness.
Saturday, May 26, 2012
The Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study of the Madhyamika System / T.R.V. Murti -- London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955
The Four Noble Truths often stand out as the central ideas of Buddhism among Western Buddhists and perhaps rightly so. The recognition of the fact of suffering, the cause of suffering, the elimination of suffering, and the practical method for doing so is critical to any understanding of Buddhism. All schools of Buddhism accept these truths. After the Four Noble Truths, the concept of the bodhisattva is perhaps the second most significant Buddhist concept. It is among the advances over primitive Buddhism that the Mahayana school generated. Embracing these ideas is likely to place one squarely on the path of the Buddha, refine one's spirituality, and enhance the quality of one's life. The history of Buddhism, however, offers more subtle concepts than these which can lead one still deeper into the enlightenment that Buddhism offers. Chief among these, according to T.R.V. Murti, is the concept of sunyata, or what some have translated as "emptiness," which he admirably explicates in his masterful work, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism.
The work is divided into three parts: the origin and development of the Madhyamaka philosophy, an exposition of the philosophy itself, and a comparison of it to other systems, especially Western philosophical systems. This is not a book for beginners. To appreciate the work, one should already have a good background in the Madhyamaka tradition, but also the Theravada, Sarvastivada, and Yogacara Buddhist traditions and the Hindu Advaita Vedanta.
The "central philosophy" that Murti identifies is a philosophical "dialectic" advanced by the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna which results in the recognition that absolute reality is sunyata or emptiness. The Madhyamika first of all accepts that there is a division between the world of ordinary experience and absolute reality. This sets it apart from the early Buddhism of the Theravada and Sarvastivada schools, which asserted the reality of the dharmas, i.e., elemental or atomic units of existence which were infinitesimally extended in time and space. Early Buddhism rejected the ultimate reality of composite objects, including the self. Indeed, on this view all things lack substance or permanent identical reality. Consequently, early Buddhism did not maintain an absolutist metaphysic.
In contrast, the Madhyamaka view accepts that there is an absolute reality beyond the ordinary empirical realm composed of the early Buddhist dharmas, but it rejects any suggestion that our reason can bring us to understand this reality. This sets Madhyamaka Buddhism apart from two other absolutist philosophies, the Yogacara's Vijnanavada or Consciousness Only philosophy, and the Upanishadic Advaita Vedanta philosophy which posits the absolute as Brahman and equates it with Atman, making the absolute a kind of universal soul.
According to Murti, all three of these non-Madhyamaka philosophies are speculative metaphysics which the Madhyamaka school rejected through its dialectical critique. Madhyamaka Buddhsim exposed contradictions within each of systems and furthermore claimed that any metaphysical doctrine would fall apart under similar careful examination. However, instead of becoming nihilistic, the Madhyamaka philosophers merely concluded that reason was simply incapable of grasping the absolute and that instead, it must be immediately intuited in a non-discursive way.
One of the most informative observations in Murti's work is his comparison of the Madhyamaka philosophy to the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The contradictions uncovered in the Madhyamaka dialectic function much in the way the Kant's antinomies function in the Critique of Pure Reason. For Kant, the antinomies show that reason cannot reveal the true nature of the noumenal world (the absolute). Instead, we can merely know that our understanding of the world is shaped by the nature of our reason -- by the forms of intuition and the categories of understanding that are the standard operating equipment for how we construct the empirical world. According to Murti, the Madhyamika and Kant differ in that "Kant's Transcendental dialectic is directed against speculative metaphysics...not because he did not believe in the reality of God, Freedom and Immortality of the Soul, but because he wanted to make them safe from the unwarranted ascriptions of pure Reason. The difference between the two...is that Kant seeks to realise these noumenal realities in a non-intellectual mode -- Faith and practical Reason; the Madhyamika does it in Intellectual Intuition -- Prajnaparamita."
As profound as Murti's work is, I am left wondering whether the dialectic of the Madhyamaka philosophy, insofar as it is based on The Large Sutra of Perfect Wisdom, is not more like Kant's critical philosophy than he suggests. Where Kant resorts to practical reason to arrive at his absolute (the three transcendental ideas: God, freedom, and the immortal soul), The Large Sutra of Perfect Wisdom employs "skill in means" to perfect wisdom and reach the "Intellectual Intuition" of the absolute. Skill in means seems nothing if not practical reason unconsciously performed.
Regardless of this criticism, Murti's work is among the finest treatments of Buddhist epistemology and metaphysics ever written. Anyone seeking a good understanding of Buddhism would be well-advised to procure a copy and, while reading it, search out whatever other works might fill in the gaps of one's understanding.
The work is divided into three parts: the origin and development of the Madhyamaka philosophy, an exposition of the philosophy itself, and a comparison of it to other systems, especially Western philosophical systems. This is not a book for beginners. To appreciate the work, one should already have a good background in the Madhyamaka tradition, but also the Theravada, Sarvastivada, and Yogacara Buddhist traditions and the Hindu Advaita Vedanta.
The "central philosophy" that Murti identifies is a philosophical "dialectic" advanced by the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna which results in the recognition that absolute reality is sunyata or emptiness. The Madhyamika first of all accepts that there is a division between the world of ordinary experience and absolute reality. This sets it apart from the early Buddhism of the Theravada and Sarvastivada schools, which asserted the reality of the dharmas, i.e., elemental or atomic units of existence which were infinitesimally extended in time and space. Early Buddhism rejected the ultimate reality of composite objects, including the self. Indeed, on this view all things lack substance or permanent identical reality. Consequently, early Buddhism did not maintain an absolutist metaphysic.
In contrast, the Madhyamaka view accepts that there is an absolute reality beyond the ordinary empirical realm composed of the early Buddhist dharmas, but it rejects any suggestion that our reason can bring us to understand this reality. This sets Madhyamaka Buddhism apart from two other absolutist philosophies, the Yogacara's Vijnanavada or Consciousness Only philosophy, and the Upanishadic Advaita Vedanta philosophy which posits the absolute as Brahman and equates it with Atman, making the absolute a kind of universal soul.
According to Murti, all three of these non-Madhyamaka philosophies are speculative metaphysics which the Madhyamaka school rejected through its dialectical critique. Madhyamaka Buddhsim exposed contradictions within each of systems and furthermore claimed that any metaphysical doctrine would fall apart under similar careful examination. However, instead of becoming nihilistic, the Madhyamaka philosophers merely concluded that reason was simply incapable of grasping the absolute and that instead, it must be immediately intuited in a non-discursive way.
One of the most informative observations in Murti's work is his comparison of the Madhyamaka philosophy to the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The contradictions uncovered in the Madhyamaka dialectic function much in the way the Kant's antinomies function in the Critique of Pure Reason. For Kant, the antinomies show that reason cannot reveal the true nature of the noumenal world (the absolute). Instead, we can merely know that our understanding of the world is shaped by the nature of our reason -- by the forms of intuition and the categories of understanding that are the standard operating equipment for how we construct the empirical world. According to Murti, the Madhyamika and Kant differ in that "Kant's Transcendental dialectic is directed against speculative metaphysics...not because he did not believe in the reality of God, Freedom and Immortality of the Soul, but because he wanted to make them safe from the unwarranted ascriptions of pure Reason. The difference between the two...is that Kant seeks to realise these noumenal realities in a non-intellectual mode -- Faith and practical Reason; the Madhyamika does it in Intellectual Intuition -- Prajnaparamita."
As profound as Murti's work is, I am left wondering whether the dialectic of the Madhyamaka philosophy, insofar as it is based on The Large Sutra of Perfect Wisdom, is not more like Kant's critical philosophy than he suggests. Where Kant resorts to practical reason to arrive at his absolute (the three transcendental ideas: God, freedom, and the immortal soul), The Large Sutra of Perfect Wisdom employs "skill in means" to perfect wisdom and reach the "Intellectual Intuition" of the absolute. Skill in means seems nothing if not practical reason unconsciously performed.
Regardless of this criticism, Murti's work is among the finest treatments of Buddhist epistemology and metaphysics ever written. Anyone seeking a good understanding of Buddhism would be well-advised to procure a copy and, while reading it, search out whatever other works might fill in the gaps of one's understanding.
Friday, April 27, 2012
The Battle of Pea Ridge: The Civil War Fight for the Ozarks / James R. Knight -- Charleston, S.C.: The History Press, 2012
There is probably no conflict that has been written about more than the U.S. Civil War. This is both due to the large audience for such works and the large number of amateur historians who are able to find publishers for their research. Such research usually focuses narrowly on a subject that is glossed over or even completely ignored by more general, popular works. The best of this work is based on local historical archives and other primary sources and casts the war or events in the war in a new and valuable light. The worst of it is highly derivative and contributes little to what is already known about the war. Often, these works detail events that provide no help in gaining a deeper understanding of the significance of the war. Sadly, James Knight's short book The Battle of Pea Ridge falls more in the latter category than the former.
The Battle of Pea Ridge is precisely what the title suggests: a blow by blow (or movement by movement) account of the battle between Earl Van Dorn's Confederate army and Samuel R. Curtis's Union army. It is mostly workman-like recounting of the events of the battle, though the presentation is sometimes disjointed and the writing is at best journalistic. It will be of interest to amateur military historians, but more expert historians might be disappointed. Its end notes indicate that it owes a great deal to William Shea and Earl Hess's book Pea Ridge (Chapel Hill, N.C.: UNC Press, 1992) and The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 8 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1880-1901).
Knight rightly recognizes that the battle is of much greater significance than it is commonly accorded, but it is a shame that he did not do more to place the battle in its broader social and political context.
The Battle of Pea Ridge is precisely what the title suggests: a blow by blow (or movement by movement) account of the battle between Earl Van Dorn's Confederate army and Samuel R. Curtis's Union army. It is mostly workman-like recounting of the events of the battle, though the presentation is sometimes disjointed and the writing is at best journalistic. It will be of interest to amateur military historians, but more expert historians might be disappointed. Its end notes indicate that it owes a great deal to William Shea and Earl Hess's book Pea Ridge (Chapel Hill, N.C.: UNC Press, 1992) and The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 8 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1880-1901).
Knight rightly recognizes that the battle is of much greater significance than it is commonly accorded, but it is a shame that he did not do more to place the battle in its broader social and political context.
Wednesday, April 25, 2012
The Information Diet: A Case for Conscious Consumption / Clay A. Johnson -- Sebastopol, Cal.: O'Reilly Media, Inc., 2012
Quite a number of books have been published in response to the explosion of digital information and the technology that delivers it. Many of the works are breathless panegyrics. Others are panicky jeremiads. This should come as no surprise. Digital and internet technology has transformed our lives in unexpected ways and promises to continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Consequently, assessing the opportunities and dangers is no easy task, making it easy to predict both best case and worst case scenarios for the future.
Clay Johnson's The Information Diet is neither a best nor worst case assessment of our information future. His general disposition is that our social problems can often be addressed by technical solutions and as the founder of Blue State Digital and a former director of the Sunlight Foundation. So one might expect his leanings would be toward panegyrics. Nonetheless, the overall tone of his book is cautionary. Johnson has become concerned that far from solving our social problems, current information and internet technology is filling our information diets with the equivalent of junk food and poses a significant threat to the rational formation of public policy. Johnson is not only concerned about the individual's epistemic health, he is concerned about the effects that widespread "information obesity" is having and will have on society as a whole.
Much of Johnson's work is not particularly ground breaking. His analogy between information and food diets is perhaps the most novel feature of the work. The two critiques that most inform Johnson are by Nicholas Carr and Eli Pariser. Carr argues that the internet has come to be a complex distraction machine, designed to maximize the number of pages that we view. This has grave psychological consequences for our ability to concentrate, engage in deep, thoughtful reading, and remember what it is that we have read. Eli Pariser argues that the personalization of search results on the internet results in your receiving only information with which you agree, doing nothing more than confirming your previously held views. For politics, this means that people of with differing views are becoming more deeply convinced that their views are well-substantiated. Consequently, our ability to carry on reasonable dialogs with those who hold different views from us is declining.
Johnson is clearly sympathetic to Pariser's concerns. His attitudes toward Carr's thesis is, however, more complicated. Johnson writes, "the Internet is not some kind of meta bogey man that's sneaking into Mr. Carr's room while he sleeps and rewiring his brain." He also suggests that there is a "subtext" to Carr's thesis that "there may be some sort of corporate conspiracy to try to...'dumb us down.'" Having read Carr's recent book The Shallows, I am amazed that Johnson would find a conspiracy subtext in it. Furthermore, suggesting that Carr sees the Internet as a "meta bogey man" (whatever that might be) trivializes his arguments.
Johnson's critique of Carr appears to be founded on the power a person's will. He writes, "Blaming a medium or its creators for changing our minds and habits is like blaming food for making us fat." Such a view, "wrongly take[s] free will and choice out of the equation." For Johnson, the problem arises because we choose specific friends in an online social network, we choose to follow specific links, and we choose to spend a specific amount of time "consuming" specific information. Apparently for Johnson, only we are to blame for the changes we experience as we live our lives, more and more, in front of computer screens.
It is strange, though, that the great bulk of Johnson's book describes the powerful influences that the internet has on shaping all of these behaviors. One is left with the sense that Johnson has internalized Carr's criticism, but is unwilling to acknowledge it. To avoid doing so, he constructs a straw argument to attack and appeals to a dubious metaphysical dogma about free will.
His metaphysics does, however, underwrite the practical point of his book: to encourage us to take responsibility for the information we acquire. He writes, "This book's agenda is to help people make more sense of the world around them by encouraging them to tune into things that matter most and to tune out things that make them sick." This is unquestionably a worthy agenda. The amount of trivia that pours out of the internet when you dare to expose yourself to it is breathtaking.
Johnson's recommendations for tuning into the stuff that matters and tuning out the trivia is technological. For example, he recommends various filters and email preference settings that will reduce unwanted information. He recommends software that will show you the amount of time you spend at various kinds of Web sites and techniques for developing your ability to concentrate. All of his suggestions are fine as far as they go, but are hardly likely to achieve great success. The internet is insidious and seductive. Most of all, it is constructed to serve a profit motive which will not succeed unless most people participate in what it is doing to us. When information becomes the lure for commerce, widespread information obesity will naturally follow.
In general, Johnson's The Information Diet underestimates the power of the structural forces driving the internet and overestimates the power of individuals to resist its damaging force. Realistically, we may have only two choices: to embrace the brave new world of the digital information or to create a nearly internet-free counterculture that values face-to-face social interactions over virtual ones and makes limited forays into the virtual world for only specific and limited purposes.
Clay Johnson's The Information Diet is neither a best nor worst case assessment of our information future. His general disposition is that our social problems can often be addressed by technical solutions and as the founder of Blue State Digital and a former director of the Sunlight Foundation. So one might expect his leanings would be toward panegyrics. Nonetheless, the overall tone of his book is cautionary. Johnson has become concerned that far from solving our social problems, current information and internet technology is filling our information diets with the equivalent of junk food and poses a significant threat to the rational formation of public policy. Johnson is not only concerned about the individual's epistemic health, he is concerned about the effects that widespread "information obesity" is having and will have on society as a whole.
Much of Johnson's work is not particularly ground breaking. His analogy between information and food diets is perhaps the most novel feature of the work. The two critiques that most inform Johnson are by Nicholas Carr and Eli Pariser. Carr argues that the internet has come to be a complex distraction machine, designed to maximize the number of pages that we view. This has grave psychological consequences for our ability to concentrate, engage in deep, thoughtful reading, and remember what it is that we have read. Eli Pariser argues that the personalization of search results on the internet results in your receiving only information with which you agree, doing nothing more than confirming your previously held views. For politics, this means that people of with differing views are becoming more deeply convinced that their views are well-substantiated. Consequently, our ability to carry on reasonable dialogs with those who hold different views from us is declining.
Johnson is clearly sympathetic to Pariser's concerns. His attitudes toward Carr's thesis is, however, more complicated. Johnson writes, "the Internet is not some kind of meta bogey man that's sneaking into Mr. Carr's room while he sleeps and rewiring his brain." He also suggests that there is a "subtext" to Carr's thesis that "there may be some sort of corporate conspiracy to try to...'dumb us down.'" Having read Carr's recent book The Shallows, I am amazed that Johnson would find a conspiracy subtext in it. Furthermore, suggesting that Carr sees the Internet as a "meta bogey man" (whatever that might be) trivializes his arguments.
Johnson's critique of Carr appears to be founded on the power a person's will. He writes, "Blaming a medium or its creators for changing our minds and habits is like blaming food for making us fat." Such a view, "wrongly take[s] free will and choice out of the equation." For Johnson, the problem arises because we choose specific friends in an online social network, we choose to follow specific links, and we choose to spend a specific amount of time "consuming" specific information. Apparently for Johnson, only we are to blame for the changes we experience as we live our lives, more and more, in front of computer screens.
It is strange, though, that the great bulk of Johnson's book describes the powerful influences that the internet has on shaping all of these behaviors. One is left with the sense that Johnson has internalized Carr's criticism, but is unwilling to acknowledge it. To avoid doing so, he constructs a straw argument to attack and appeals to a dubious metaphysical dogma about free will.
His metaphysics does, however, underwrite the practical point of his book: to encourage us to take responsibility for the information we acquire. He writes, "This book's agenda is to help people make more sense of the world around them by encouraging them to tune into things that matter most and to tune out things that make them sick." This is unquestionably a worthy agenda. The amount of trivia that pours out of the internet when you dare to expose yourself to it is breathtaking.
Johnson's recommendations for tuning into the stuff that matters and tuning out the trivia is technological. For example, he recommends various filters and email preference settings that will reduce unwanted information. He recommends software that will show you the amount of time you spend at various kinds of Web sites and techniques for developing your ability to concentrate. All of his suggestions are fine as far as they go, but are hardly likely to achieve great success. The internet is insidious and seductive. Most of all, it is constructed to serve a profit motive which will not succeed unless most people participate in what it is doing to us. When information becomes the lure for commerce, widespread information obesity will naturally follow.
In general, Johnson's The Information Diet underestimates the power of the structural forces driving the internet and overestimates the power of individuals to resist its damaging force. Realistically, we may have only two choices: to embrace the brave new world of the digital information or to create a nearly internet-free counterculture that values face-to-face social interactions over virtual ones and makes limited forays into the virtual world for only specific and limited purposes.
Labels:
Computer Science,
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Political Science,
Psychology
Sunday, April 22, 2012
The Awakening a Faith / Attributed to Asvagosha -- Yoshito S. Hakeda, tr. -- N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1967
The following review covers two translations of The Awakening of Faith. One by Timothy Richard and the other by Yoshido S. Hakeda.
I recently read two translations of The Awakening of Faith which is a concise presentation of the central ideas of Mahayana Buddhism. It is attributed to the Buddhist philosopher Asvagosha who is thought to have lived in the first to second century. It was thought to have been translated from Sanskrit into Chinese around the year 550; however, no Sanskrit version is extant. Consequently, many believe that it is in fact exclusively a Chinese work written in the 5th or 6th century.
The first of these two versions was translated by Timothy Richard in 1894. Richard describes how he first encountered The Awakening of Faith in 1884. He was struck by the fact that it was, in his words, "a Christian book." Perhaps motivated by the publication in 1900 of D.T. Suzuki's translation, Richard published his translation in 1907 (Hyde Park, N.Y.: University Books). Richard consciously gave the work a notable Christian flavor. Richard wrote of Suzuki and his translation, "as he approaches the subject from a non-Christian point of view, the light which comes from a comparison between it and Christianity is denied him." Apparently, Suzuki's problem was that he interpreted a Buddhist text from a Buddhist point of view. For Richard, the preferred approach is to interpret it from a Christian point of view. This approach is, of course, problematic. It reverses the optimal order in which comparisons should be made between religious traditions and their texts.
There is no clear evidence that the author of The Awakening of Faith was significantly influenced by Christianity; hence, any parallels between the work and Christianity would suggest independent recognition of the same religious or spiritual ideas. Drawing parallels should only be done, however, after the comparable works are translated using the unique idioms of their separate traditions. To translate one into the idiom of the other essentially forces the parallels to the surface and hides any alternative interpretation of the relationships between the traditions. To translate key terms of one tradition into the vocabulary of another tradition creates a pseudo-translation that appropriates the source text to serve the purposes of an alien tradition. The proper method of translating and comparing texts from different traditions would be to retain the idiom of the source text as much as possible through translation and only then compare its content to the alien tradition.
A far better translation is available, however, from Yoshita S. Hakeda. Hakeda notes that his text is translated in light of traditional commentaries, particularly those by Hui-yuan (523-592), Wonhyo (617-686), and Fa-tsang (643-712). Hakeda's translation is notably more literal than Richards and the vocabulary into which the work is translated is more standard within the Buddhist tradition. For example, Hakeda translates "Chen Ju" as "Suchness," while Richard translates it as "True Model," meaning God. Richard also suggests that what has been translated by Hakeda as "Tathagata" might be sometimes best translated as "Messiah."
The text of The Awakening of Faith is divided into five unequal parts: (1) a brief explanation of the reasons for writing the work, (2) a concise outline of what is to be elaborated in the work, (3) an exposition of the main philosophical ideas of the book, (4) a guide to the practical application of the ideas in section (3), and (5) devotional practices recommended by the author. Section (3) constitutes 2/3 of the entire work and is clearly the most significant section. Here the central idea of "Suchness" or the all-inclusive reality or the unconditional absolute is developed. Suchness is first of all monistic; however, the author recognizes that it has two aspects: transcendental and phenomenal. Ontologically, they are one, but epistemologically they are two. Furthermore, it is fundamentally "mind" and so most of the section is an elaboration of the nature of mind in both nirvana and samsara. These, however, consistent with the general monism of the philosophy, are ultimately described as being one and the same.
The Awakening of Faith is of great importance to several Chinese, Korean, and Japanese Buddhist schools, particularly the Hua-yen, Ch'an, Zen, and Pure Land schools.
My reading of this work was something of a disappointment. My expectations were built out of my recollections from having read the Richard translation many years ago. At that time, I found it to be among the most enlightening books I had encountered. This may have been a consequence of my then fascination with mysticism. Richard's translation rightly emphasizes this aspect of the work and for anyone interested in the mystical currents in Buddhism, The Awakening of Faith is well worth reading.
I recently read two translations of The Awakening of Faith which is a concise presentation of the central ideas of Mahayana Buddhism. It is attributed to the Buddhist philosopher Asvagosha who is thought to have lived in the first to second century. It was thought to have been translated from Sanskrit into Chinese around the year 550; however, no Sanskrit version is extant. Consequently, many believe that it is in fact exclusively a Chinese work written in the 5th or 6th century.
The first of these two versions was translated by Timothy Richard in 1894. Richard describes how he first encountered The Awakening of Faith in 1884. He was struck by the fact that it was, in his words, "a Christian book." Perhaps motivated by the publication in 1900 of D.T. Suzuki's translation, Richard published his translation in 1907 (Hyde Park, N.Y.: University Books). Richard consciously gave the work a notable Christian flavor. Richard wrote of Suzuki and his translation, "as he approaches the subject from a non-Christian point of view, the light which comes from a comparison between it and Christianity is denied him." Apparently, Suzuki's problem was that he interpreted a Buddhist text from a Buddhist point of view. For Richard, the preferred approach is to interpret it from a Christian point of view. This approach is, of course, problematic. It reverses the optimal order in which comparisons should be made between religious traditions and their texts.
There is no clear evidence that the author of The Awakening of Faith was significantly influenced by Christianity; hence, any parallels between the work and Christianity would suggest independent recognition of the same religious or spiritual ideas. Drawing parallels should only be done, however, after the comparable works are translated using the unique idioms of their separate traditions. To translate one into the idiom of the other essentially forces the parallels to the surface and hides any alternative interpretation of the relationships between the traditions. To translate key terms of one tradition into the vocabulary of another tradition creates a pseudo-translation that appropriates the source text to serve the purposes of an alien tradition. The proper method of translating and comparing texts from different traditions would be to retain the idiom of the source text as much as possible through translation and only then compare its content to the alien tradition.
A far better translation is available, however, from Yoshita S. Hakeda. Hakeda notes that his text is translated in light of traditional commentaries, particularly those by Hui-yuan (523-592), Wonhyo (617-686), and Fa-tsang (643-712). Hakeda's translation is notably more literal than Richards and the vocabulary into which the work is translated is more standard within the Buddhist tradition. For example, Hakeda translates "Chen Ju" as "Suchness," while Richard translates it as "True Model," meaning God. Richard also suggests that what has been translated by Hakeda as "Tathagata" might be sometimes best translated as "Messiah."
The text of The Awakening of Faith is divided into five unequal parts: (1) a brief explanation of the reasons for writing the work, (2) a concise outline of what is to be elaborated in the work, (3) an exposition of the main philosophical ideas of the book, (4) a guide to the practical application of the ideas in section (3), and (5) devotional practices recommended by the author. Section (3) constitutes 2/3 of the entire work and is clearly the most significant section. Here the central idea of "Suchness" or the all-inclusive reality or the unconditional absolute is developed. Suchness is first of all monistic; however, the author recognizes that it has two aspects: transcendental and phenomenal. Ontologically, they are one, but epistemologically they are two. Furthermore, it is fundamentally "mind" and so most of the section is an elaboration of the nature of mind in both nirvana and samsara. These, however, consistent with the general monism of the philosophy, are ultimately described as being one and the same.
The Awakening of Faith is of great importance to several Chinese, Korean, and Japanese Buddhist schools, particularly the Hua-yen, Ch'an, Zen, and Pure Land schools.
My reading of this work was something of a disappointment. My expectations were built out of my recollections from having read the Richard translation many years ago. At that time, I found it to be among the most enlightening books I had encountered. This may have been a consequence of my then fascination with mysticism. Richard's translation rightly emphasizes this aspect of the work and for anyone interested in the mystical currents in Buddhism, The Awakening of Faith is well worth reading.
Monday, April 16, 2012
The Awakening of Faith / Ashvagosha -- Timothy Richard, tr. -- New Hyde Park, NY: University Books, 1960
The following review covers two translations of The Awakening of Faith. One by Timothy Richard and the other by Yoshido S. Hakeda.
I recently read two translations of The Awakening of Faith which is a concise presentation of the central ideas of Mahayana Buddhism. It is attributed to the Buddhist philosopher Asvagosha who is thought to have lived in the first to second century. It was thought to have been translated from Sanskrit into Chinese around the year 550; however, no Sanskrit version is extant. Consequently, many believe that it is in fact exclusively a Chinese work written in the 5th or 6th century.
The first of these two versions was translated by Timothy Richard in 1894. Richard describes how he first encountered The Awakening of Faith in 1884. He was struck by the fact that it was, in his words, "a Christian book." Perhaps motivated by the publication in 1900 of D.T. Suzuki's translation, Richard published his translation in 1907 (Hyde Park, N.Y.: University Books). Richard consciously gave the work a notable Christian flavor. Richard wrote of Suzuki and his translation, "as he approaches the subject from a non-Christian point of view, the light which comes from a comparison between it and Christianity is denied him." Apparently, Suzuki's problem was that he interpreted a Buddhist text from a Buddhist point of view. For Richard, the preferred approach is to interpret it from a Christian point of view. This approach is, of course, problematic. It reverses the optimal order in which comparisons should be made between religious traditions and their texts.
There is no clear evidence that the author of The Awakening of Faith was significantly influenced by Christianity; hence, any parallels between the work and Christianity would suggest independent recognition of the same religious or spiritual ideas. Drawing parallels should only be done, however, after the comparable works are translated using the unique idioms of their separate traditions. To translate one into the idiom of the other essentially forces the parallels to the surface and hides any alternative interpretation of the relationships between the traditions. To translate key terms of one tradition into the vocabulary of another tradition creates a pseudo-translation that appropriates the source text to serve the purposes of an alien tradition. The proper method of translating and comparing texts from different traditions would be to retain the idiom of the source text as much as possible through translation and only then compare its content to the alien tradition.
A far better translation is available, however, from Yoshita S. Hakeda. Hakeda notes that his text is translated in light of traditional commentaries, particularly those by Hui-yuan (523-592), Wonhyo (617-686), and Fa-tsang (643-712). Hakeda's translation is notably more literal than Richards and the vocabulary into which the work is translated is more standard within the Buddhist tradition. For example, Hakeda translates "Chen Ju" as "Suchness," while Richard translates it as "True Model," meaning God. Richard also suggests that what has been translated by Hakeda as "Tathagata" might be sometimes best translated as "Messiah."
The text of The Awakening of Faith is divided into five unequal parts: (1) a brief explanation of the reasons for writing the work, (2) a concise outline of what is to be elaborated in the work, (3) an exposition of the main philosophical ideas of the book, (4) a guide to the practical application of the ideas in section (3), and (5) devotional practices recommended by the author. Section (3) constitutes 2/3 of the entire work and is clearly the most significant section. Here the central idea of "Suchness" or the all-inclusive reality or the unconditional absolute is developed. Suchness is first of all monistic; however, the author recognizes that it has two aspects: transcendental and phenomenal. Ontologically, they are one, but epistemologically they are two. Furthermore, it is fundamentally "mind" and so most of the section is an elaboration of the nature of mind in both nirvana and samsara. These, however, consistent with the general monism of the philosophy, are ultimately described as being one and the same.
The Awakening of Faith is of great importance to several Chinese, Korean, and Japanese Buddhist schools, particularly the Hua-yen, Ch'an, Zen, and Pure Land schools.
My reading of this work was something of a disappointment. My expectations were built out of my recollections from having read the Richard translation many years ago. At that time, I found it to be among the most enlightening books I had encountered. This may have been a consequence of my then fascination with mysticism. Richard's translation rightly emphasizes this aspect of the work and for anyone interested in the mystical currents in Buddhism, The Awakening of Faith is well worth reading.
I recently read two translations of The Awakening of Faith which is a concise presentation of the central ideas of Mahayana Buddhism. It is attributed to the Buddhist philosopher Asvagosha who is thought to have lived in the first to second century. It was thought to have been translated from Sanskrit into Chinese around the year 550; however, no Sanskrit version is extant. Consequently, many believe that it is in fact exclusively a Chinese work written in the 5th or 6th century.
The first of these two versions was translated by Timothy Richard in 1894. Richard describes how he first encountered The Awakening of Faith in 1884. He was struck by the fact that it was, in his words, "a Christian book." Perhaps motivated by the publication in 1900 of D.T. Suzuki's translation, Richard published his translation in 1907 (Hyde Park, N.Y.: University Books). Richard consciously gave the work a notable Christian flavor. Richard wrote of Suzuki and his translation, "as he approaches the subject from a non-Christian point of view, the light which comes from a comparison between it and Christianity is denied him." Apparently, Suzuki's problem was that he interpreted a Buddhist text from a Buddhist point of view. For Richard, the preferred approach is to interpret it from a Christian point of view. This approach is, of course, problematic. It reverses the optimal order in which comparisons should be made between religious traditions and their texts.
There is no clear evidence that the author of The Awakening of Faith was significantly influenced by Christianity; hence, any parallels between the work and Christianity would suggest independent recognition of the same religious or spiritual ideas. Drawing parallels should only be done, however, after the comparable works are translated using the unique idioms of their separate traditions. To translate one into the idiom of the other essentially forces the parallels to the surface and hides any alternative interpretation of the relationships between the traditions. To translate key terms of one tradition into the vocabulary of another tradition creates a pseudo-translation that appropriates the source text to serve the purposes of an alien tradition. The proper method of translating and comparing texts from different traditions would be to retain the idiom of the source text as much as possible through translation and only then compare its content to the alien tradition.
A far better translation is available, however, from Yoshita S. Hakeda. Hakeda notes that his text is translated in light of traditional commentaries, particularly those by Hui-yuan (523-592), Wonhyo (617-686), and Fa-tsang (643-712). Hakeda's translation is notably more literal than Richards and the vocabulary into which the work is translated is more standard within the Buddhist tradition. For example, Hakeda translates "Chen Ju" as "Suchness," while Richard translates it as "True Model," meaning God. Richard also suggests that what has been translated by Hakeda as "Tathagata" might be sometimes best translated as "Messiah."
The text of The Awakening of Faith is divided into five unequal parts: (1) a brief explanation of the reasons for writing the work, (2) a concise outline of what is to be elaborated in the work, (3) an exposition of the main philosophical ideas of the book, (4) a guide to the practical application of the ideas in section (3), and (5) devotional practices recommended by the author. Section (3) constitutes 2/3 of the entire work and is clearly the most significant section. Here the central idea of "Suchness" or the all-inclusive reality or the unconditional absolute is developed. Suchness is first of all monistic; however, the author recognizes that it has two aspects: transcendental and phenomenal. Ontologically, they are one, but epistemologically they are two. Furthermore, it is fundamentally "mind" and so most of the section is an elaboration of the nature of mind in both nirvana and samsara. These, however, consistent with the general monism of the philosophy, are ultimately described as being one and the same.
The Awakening of Faith is of great importance to several Chinese, Korean, and Japanese Buddhist schools, particularly the Hua-yen, Ch'an, Zen, and Pure Land schools.
My reading of this work was something of a disappointment. My expectations were built out of my recollections from having read the Richard translation many years ago. At that time, I found it to be among the most enlightening books I had encountered. This may have been a consequence of my then fascination with mysticism. Richard's translation rightly emphasizes this aspect of the work and for anyone interested in the mystical currents in Buddhism, The Awakening of Faith is well worth reading.
Sunday, April 8, 2012
Buddhism: Its Essence and Development / Edward Conze -- N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1975
Edward Conze's Buddhism: Its Essence and Development is among the most popular general introductions to Buddhism and for good reason. Conze is one of history's foremost European scholars of Buddhism. He translated numerous sutras and shastras and wrote works of his own on the history and philosophy of Buddhism.
The subtitle of Buddhism: Its Essence and Development aptly describes the character of the work. The early pages provide a brief listing, and account of the significance of the most important Buddhist documents and address some of the common questions and impressions about Buddhism that arose in Europe and the U.S., e.g., Is Buddhism atheistic and is it a pessimistic philosophy?
The core of the work describes the philosophical tenets of early Buddhism and those ideas that most all Buddhists accept, e.g., The Four Noble Truths. It also describes how different Buddhist schools of thought developed these ideas. In particular, the doctrines of the Theravadin, Sarvastivadin, and Mahasangikan schools are discussed and then later, he presents the doctrines of the Mahayana tradition (the Madhyamika and Yogacara schools). All of this might count as the "essence" of Buddhism.
Its "development" describes the full scope of historical Buddhism, including how it became transformed by the specific cultures that adopted it. Here the magical and mythological views that became attached to the core ideas are discussed. Conze also presents the views of Bhakti, Tantric, and Pure Land Buddhism. These seem to reside at the intersection between reasonable developments of Buddhist thought and the degeneration of its core ideas, brought on by the superstitions of the societies which produced these schools.
Perhaps the greatest (only?) weakness of the work is the brevity of the treatment that Conze gives to Ch'an and Zen Buddhism, making the work a bit too "Indo-centric" as a general treatment of Buddhism. At just over 200 pages, the work could have been much improved with an additional 30-50 pages on these schools of Buddhism.
The subtitle of Buddhism: Its Essence and Development aptly describes the character of the work. The early pages provide a brief listing, and account of the significance of the most important Buddhist documents and address some of the common questions and impressions about Buddhism that arose in Europe and the U.S., e.g., Is Buddhism atheistic and is it a pessimistic philosophy?
The core of the work describes the philosophical tenets of early Buddhism and those ideas that most all Buddhists accept, e.g., The Four Noble Truths. It also describes how different Buddhist schools of thought developed these ideas. In particular, the doctrines of the Theravadin, Sarvastivadin, and Mahasangikan schools are discussed and then later, he presents the doctrines of the Mahayana tradition (the Madhyamika and Yogacara schools). All of this might count as the "essence" of Buddhism.
Its "development" describes the full scope of historical Buddhism, including how it became transformed by the specific cultures that adopted it. Here the magical and mythological views that became attached to the core ideas are discussed. Conze also presents the views of Bhakti, Tantric, and Pure Land Buddhism. These seem to reside at the intersection between reasonable developments of Buddhist thought and the degeneration of its core ideas, brought on by the superstitions of the societies which produced these schools.
Perhaps the greatest (only?) weakness of the work is the brevity of the treatment that Conze gives to Ch'an and Zen Buddhism, making the work a bit too "Indo-centric" as a general treatment of Buddhism. At just over 200 pages, the work could have been much improved with an additional 30-50 pages on these schools of Buddhism.
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